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i n the last twenty years, there has been a significant rise in the popularity of tattoos. Once relegated to the marginal realm of sailors, motorcycle gang members, or dock workers, tattoos are now proudly displayed by 
NBA stars, rock artists, and film actors.1 Perhaps not surprisingly, American 
workers, particularly younger workers, have emulated their idols and obtained 
tattoos too—at a remarkable rate.  In fact, a 2012 Harris Poll found that one 
in five American adults had at least one tattoo.2 And while increasing per-
centages of Americans view tattoos as acceptable (indeed, even as art), tattoos 
still carry a persistent stigma among many members of society—including 
many employers.3
There are a number of media reports of tattooed applicants being denied 
jobs,4 and even stories of employees being disciplined or discharged for having 
tattoos.5 But with what result? What liability may an employer have for refusing 
to hire an applicant with a tattoo, or for discharging a tattooed employee? This 
article summarizes the current state of the law on this increasingly complicated 
and timely question. Claims have been brought by public sector applicants 
and employees alleging violations of the their Fourteenth Amendment right 
to equal protection and/or their First Amendment right to free speech, and by 
private sector applicants and employees alleging violations of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 or state nondiscrimination laws.6 As the number of 
tattooed applicants and employees increases, we may expect to see further chal-
lenges to an employer’s decision to reject a tattooed applicant or to discipline a 
tattooed employee.
Constitutional Claims
Because public agencies function in a dual role—not only as an employer su-
pervising an employee, but also as government agents exercising control over 
a citizen--they may be held liable for violations of the Constitutional rights of 
their employees.7 As noted above, challenges have been brought by tattooed 
public employees or applicants as equal protection claims or free speech claims. 
There is also a possibility that a claim may be brought as a Fourteenth Amend-
ment liberty interest claim. Each of these grounds for challenge are addressed 
in turn below.
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equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides that no state shall “deny any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”8 Reduced 
to its simplest terms in the employment context, the Equal 
Protection Clause directs that all employees similarly situ-
ated should be treated in the same manner. To determine 
the validity of any challenged classification, a reviewing 
court must determine the proper standard of review. 
Generally, “legislation is presumed to be valid and will be 
sustained if the classification drawn ... is rationally related 
to a legitimate state interest.”9 If, however, the classification 
is based on the suspect classifications of race, alienage, or 
national origin, or if a fundamental right is involved, the 
classification will be subjected to strict scrutiny and will 
only be upheld by the court if the classification serves a 
compelling state interest.10 An applicant for employment 
or an employee alleging a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause must show that he or she is a member of a 
protected class, is otherwise similarly situated to members 
of the unprotected class, and that he or she was treated 
differently from members of the unprotected class.11 The 
applicant or employee must demonstrate that the employer 
acted with a discriminatory purpose.12
Two cases have arisen in which tattooed police officers 
challenged the employer’s requirement that they cover 
their tattoos as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
In the first case, Inturri v. City of Hartford,13 the Federal 
District Court for Connecticut denied the argument of 
five Hartford police officers that they had the right to 
display spider web tattoos on their wrists. The Hartford 
police chief had instructed the tattooed officers to wear 
long sleeves or to otherwise cover their tattoos, because the 
chief understood the spider web tattoos to signify support 
for white supremacy. The officers countered that the spider 
web tattoos had nothing to do with white supremacists, 
and that the tattoos were merely decorative; they explained 
that each web represented a year of service, and that they 
had obtained them while in the military (although they 
did concede that the tattoos could be interpreted to have 
racist overtones).  The officers claimed that their rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated 
when the police chief “arbitrarily and capriciously singl[ed] 
out the plaintiffs for differential treatment”14 because of 
their tattoos.
The district court analyzed the officers’ Fourteenth 
Amendment claim to determine whether the classifica-
tion in question—treating tattooed versus non-tattooed 
employees differently—was rationally related to a le-
gitimate governmental purpose. The court held that the 
police chief ’s concern that “the spider web tattoos could 
negatively affect relations among the officers in the depart-
ment, and between the officers in the department and 
the citizens of Hartford, especially those from minority 
groups,”15 constituted a legitimate government interest. 
The court found that the police chief “had a rational basis 
and justification for ordering that the tattoos be covered,” 
and that his order “that such tattoos be concealed while an 
officer is on duty or in uniform [was] rationally related to 
the department’s legitimate interest in fostering harmoni-
ous race relations both within the department and within 
the community.”16
In the second case, Riggs v. City of Fort Worth,17 the 
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas 
applied a rational basis standard of review to a police 
officer’s claim that he was treated differently because of 
his tattoos. The Fort Worth police chief informed officer 
Michael Riggs, who worked in a bike-patrol unit, that 
although officers in that unit could normally wear short 
sleeves and shorts, Riggs could not do so. The chief ’s con-
cern was that Riggs had extensive tattoos, highly visible 
on his arms and legs, and thus his appearance detracted 
from the professionalism of the police force. The chief 
directed Riggs to wear long sleeves and pants while on 
duty; Riggs complied, but as a result he soon suffered from 
heat exhaustion. The police chief reassigned Riggs to a desk 
job and later to a plain-clothes unit. The chief then told 
Riggs that he could wear a police officer’s uniform, but 
only if the uniform included long sleeves and long pants.
Riggs brought an Equal Protection claim against his 
employer, arguing that the police chief had treated him 
differently from his non-tattooed counterparts, and that 
there was no rational basis for the chief to have done so. 
As in the Inturri case, however, the court did not agree 
with the tattooed employee. 
The Texas federal court held that a law enforcement 
agency’s “[c]hoice of organization, dress, and equipment for 
law enforcement personnel is a decision entitled to the same 
sort of presumption of legislative validity as are state choices 
designed to promote other aims within the cognizance of 
the State’s police power.”18 The opinion noted that in other 
appearance cases courts had long held that “the city through 
its police chief has the right to promote a disciplined, iden-
tifiable, and impartial police force by maintaining its police 
uniform as a symbol of neutral government authority, free 
from expressions of personal bent or bias.”19  The court 
concluded that the police chief had legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reasons—that the tattoos would distract from 
the uniform appearance necessary for good police work--for 
requiring the only officer in the Fort Worth Police Depart-
ment who had tattoos covering his legs and arms to wear a 
uniform not required of other police officers.
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Free speech
Some public employees have argued that their tattoos 
are a form of expression or speech protected by the First 
Amendment. Under the standard announced by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Connick v. Myers,20 if a public employee 
speaks as a citizen on a matter of public concern, then 
the employer may not discipline the employee unless the 
speech is unduly disruptive of the employer’s operations. 
Although few Courts have considered the issue, those 
that have appear to agree that a tattoo is generally not pro-
tected speech under the First Amendment. For example, 
in Stephenson v. Davenport Comm. School District,21 the 
Eighth Circuit held that a high school student could be 
forced to remove a cross tattoo on her hand (which the 
school administration viewed as a gang symbol), where 
the student admitted that she did not view her tattoo as 
any form of religious expression, but was rather simply 
a form of self-expression.22 The court distinguished the 
tattoo from political speech, such as the black armband 
worn by a student to protest the Viet Nam war in Tinker 
v. Des Moines School District.”23
In Riggs v. City of Fort Worth, discussed above, the court 
held that officer Riggs’ extensive tattoos did not consti-
tute “protected expressions under the fundamental First 
Amendment right of free speech.”24 The court character-
ized Riggs’s tattoos as an expression of his personal beliefs 
rather than speech on a matter of “legitimate public con-
cern.” 25 And in Inturri v. City of Hartford, also discussed 
above, the plaintiff employees withdrew their initial free 
speech claim, instead stating that their spider web tattoos 
were not “expressive conduct.”26
Four recent cases involving tattooed applicants or 
employees show how various federal courts continue to 
wrestle with the First Amendment free speech question. 
The first recent case in which a tattooed applicant 
brought a free speech claim against a public employer is 
Scavone v. Pennsylvania State Police.27 There, the Pennsyl-
vania State Police had a policy requiring applicants for law 
enforcement position to have any tattoos reviewed by an 
agency board to determine whether an applicant was fit 
to be hired. Even though applicant Ronald Scavone was 
otherwise qualified for a liquor enforcement officer job, 
he was informed by the board that he would have to have 
one of his tattoos removed if he wanted to continue to 
be considered for the position. He refused to do so, and 
was not hired.
Scavone brought a First Amendment retaliation claim 
against the agency, alleging a causal link between his 
constitutionally protected conduct and the decision not 
to hire him, arguing that the tattoo removal policy was 
selectively enforced against him simply because he “spoke 
out and hired a lawyer.”28  The court rejected that argu-
ment, finding that he was advised to remove his tattoo in 
early June of 2008, and that he asserted in his brief that he 
first “began engaging in protected speech in ‘late 2008 and 
2009.’”29 The court concluded that because Scavone did 
not engage in any protected speech protesting the tattoo 
policy until after the policy was enforced against him, he 
was not subjected to any retaliation. More significantly, 
the court rejected the applicant’s argument that the tattoo 
policy itself violated the First Amendment.30 
The second recent First Amendment challenge arose in 
a Sixth Circuit case, Roberts v. Ward,31 and involved three 
employees of the Kentucky Department of Parks who were 
fired for failure to comply with the agency’s dress code. 
The policy required employees to have an overall neat 
appearance, to keep their shirts tucked in while on duty, 
and to be tattoo free. One of the three Parks Department 
employees, William Leslie, had a “USN” tattoo on his arm 
commemorating his service in the United States Navy. 
Leslie claimed that enforcement of the ban on tattoos 
violated his First Amendment free speech rights.
Although the court had little trouble dismissing the 
claim of the other two employees that enforcement of 
a dress code requiring them to tuck in their shirts was a 
free speech violation, the court found that Leslie’s “USN” 
tattoo “present[ed] a potentially closer question.”32 The 
employee argued that his tattoo expressed his “support, 
loyalty and affection for the U.S. Navy.”33 The court agreed 
that support for the military came much closer to speech 
on a matter of public concern than wearing untucked 
shirts. Further, the court noted that Leslie’s support for the 
military was unrelated to his job as a state park employee. 
The employer countered that Leslie’s tattoo only reflect 
his personal service in the Navy, and that the tattoo was at 
most a matter of personal taste and decoration, not speech 
on a matter of public concern. 
The court took at face value Leslie’s claim that his tattoo 
was intended to show support for the military. The key to 
whether it also constituted protected speech was “whether 
the speech is generic in nature, or whether it reflects an 
in-depth attempt to contribute to public discourse.”34 
However, because Leslie had failed to comply with the dress 
code in other ways (e.g., wearing his shirt untucked), the 
court found that the agency had an  independent basis for 
his dismissal, and that “it need not address the closer ques-
tion of the First Amendment protection of his tattoo.”35 
A third recent case involving a free speech claim by a 
tattooed public employee is Medici v. City of Chicago.36 In 
that case, a Chicago police officer named Daniel Medici 
had “two tattoos—one relating to his military service as 
a Marine and the other relating to his religious beliefs.”37 
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The Chicago Police Department issued a policy requir-
ing officers to cover up any tattoos while on duty, and 
Medici protested, claiming that the requirement that 
he wear extra clothing or cover his tattoos with adhesive 
bandages caused him to experience “overheating in warm 
weather months, as well as skin irritation and discomfort 
from the adhesive bandages.” When Medici was ordered 
to continue to cover his tattoos, he brought a free speech 
claim against the city, framing the tattoos as a form of 
speech on a matter of public concern.
The court held that Medici’s tattoos were merely a form 
of personal expression, not symbolic speech on a matter 
of public concern. Stated the court:
When an individual decides to place a symbol, a set 
of words, or a design on his or her body, he or she 
is engaging in a form of personal expression, rather 
than a form of commentary on the interests of the 
public. Furthermore, on-duty [police officers] are 
not part of the citizenry at large, but instead gov-
ernment employees, whose speech may be subject 
to restrictions that, if applied to the general public, 
may be unconstitutional. Therefore, because the 
“speech” at issue does not involve citizens com-
menting on matters of public concern, the Picker-
ing balancing test is not applicable. However, even 
if this Court were to find that the tattoos consti-
tuted citizen speech on matters of public concern, 
as the City has assumed for purposes of its motion 
to dismiss, the balance substantially weighs in favor 
of the City . . . .”38
The final recent case is the only one in which a court 
found that an employee’s tattoo constituted symbolic 
speech. In Baldetta v. Harborview Medical Center39 the 
Ninth Circuit was faced with a claim from a public 
hospital nurse named John Baldetta, who had an “HIV 
Positive” tattoo which he refused to cover while on duty. 
He claimed that his employer’s requirement that he cover 
his tattoo constituted an unwarranted infringement on his 
free speech rights as a public employee.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defi-
nition of public employee speech on a matter of public 
concern should be construed broadly, “to include almost 
any matter other than speech that relates to internal 
power struggles within the workplace.”40 Given this broad 
definition, the court concluded, Baldetta’s speech was on a 
matter of public concern.  However, applying the Picker-
ing/Connick balancing test, the court held that the public 
employer’s interests in facilitating their patients’ recovery 
outweighed the employee’s interest in displaying the tattoo, 
as “display of the tattoo would cause stress in severely in-
jured or ill patients which could hinder their recovery.”41
There are two somewhat related cases in which an em-
ployee’s complaints about the tattoos of fellow employees 
were held to be protected speech on the part of the com-
plaining employee. In the first, Robinson v. York,42  Richard 
Robinson, a sergeant with the Los Angeles County Office 
of Public Safety (OPS), filed a free speech claim in which 
he alleged that he was denied a promotion because he 
spoke out against a series of bad practices in the depart-
ment. One of the matters on which Robinson spoke was 
the fact that several police officers in the OPS wore distinc-
tive tattoos that were possibly indicative of anti-Semitic 
attitudes.43 The court held that Robinson’s complaints 
about officer misconduct in the OPS constituted speech 
on a matter of public concern, and that he was punished 
for that speech. 
In the second case, Hartwell v. City of Montgomery,44 an 
African American firefighter named Lee Hartwell com-
plained that his chief, who was white, had a tattoo on his 
bicep showing a skull and crossbones superimposed on 
a Confederate battle flag. When Hartwell was demoted 
by the fire chief, he claimed that he was disciplined for 
speaking out a matter of public concern—the racially 
discriminatory beliefs and practices of a city official. The 
court found that Hartwell engaged in protected speech 
and ordered the case to trial. 
In neither case, however, was the court called upon to 
decide whether the tattoos worn by the other employees 
constituted expressive conduct on their part. 
Liberty interest
The U.S. Supreme Court has only addressed the question 
of whether restrictions on a public employee’s appearance 
might cross Constitutional boundaries once, and it was 
forty years ago. In Kelley v. Johnson, 45 the Court considered 
the actions of the Police Commissioner of Suffolk County, 
New York in establishing hair-grooming standards for all 
male members of the police force. The Court considered 
the officers’ claim that their choice of personal appearance, 
including the decision to wear a mustache or long hair, 
was an ingredient of their personal liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court assumed the 
existence of a liberty interest on the part of the officers, it 
also found that there was a valid interest on the part of the 
government employer in promoting a uniform appearance 
of its police officers. Stated the Court:
The promotion of safety of persons and property 
is unquestionably at the core of the State’s police 
power, and virtually all state and local governments 
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employ a uniformed police force to aid in the ac-
complishment of that purpose. Choice of organi-
zation, dress, and equipment for law enforcement 
personnel is a decision entitled to the same sort 
of presumption of legislative validity as are state 
choices designed to promote other aims within the 
cognizance of the State’s police power.46
The Court then focused on the question of whether 
the Suffolk County Police Commissioner’s determination 
that those appearance regulations, including restrictions 
on hair length and facial hair, was “so irrational that it 
may be branded ‘arbitrary,’ and therefore a deprivation 
of respondent’s “liberty” interest.47  The Court answered 
that question in the negative, and upheld the grooming 
standards against the liberty interest challenge, stating:
The overwhelming majority of state and local po-
lice of the present day are uniformed. This fact it-
self testifies to the recognition by those who direct 
those operations, and by the people of the States 
and localities who directly or indirectly choose 
such persons, that similarity in appearance of po-
lice officers is desirable. This choice may be based 
on a desire to make police officers readily recogniz-
able to the members of the public, or a desire for 
the esprit de corps which such similarity is felt to 
inculcate within the police force itself. Either one is 
a sufficiently rational justification for regulations so 
as to defeat respondent’s claim based on the liberty 
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.48
Thus, after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kelley, a vi-
able avenue was created for public employees to assert 
that their Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests were 
violated when they were told how to dress, how to wear 
their hair, or whether they could display their tattoos. 
Surprisingly, however, there have been no cases in which 
public employees have brought claims that tattoo bans 
were a violation of their liberty interest, even though 
there have been numerous successful subsequent liberty 
interest claims brought by employees against dress codes, 
grooming standards, and other aspects of personal ap-
pearance.49  In only one tattoo case, Roberts v. Ward,50 
discussed in the section on free speech claims above, was 
the matter broached indirectly; there, the court noted 
that the plaintiff did not identify any liberty interest that 
would entitle him to due process protections prior to the 
change in the employer’s dress code. 
As is evident from this review of the reported cases in-
volving tattooed applicants and employees in the public 
sector, there is little likelihood of a successful constitutional 
challenge to an employer’s decision to reject a tattooed 
applicant or to require a tattooed employee to comply 
with a dress code. Equal protection challenges are likely to 
result in a finding that the public employer had a rational 
basis for treating tattooed employees differently, and free 
speech challenges face the substantial obstacle of convinc-
ing a court that a tattoo constitutes symbolic speech on a 
matter of public concern. Liberty interest challenges are, 
thus far, nonexistent.
However, this does not mean that public employers are 
free from liability. Like private sector employers, they may 
be challenged by tattooed applicants or employees who 
claim discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.51 We now turn to those cases.
Title Vii Claims
Title vii religion Cases
It might be surprising to learn that some tattooed em-
ployees have brought claims under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights act of 1964, citing the statute’s prohibition against 
employers discriminating on the basis of religion.52 None-
theless, employees have been able to state such claims. 
The statute defines the term “religion” broadly to include 
“all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well 
as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is 
unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s ... 
religious observance or practice without undue hardship 
on the conduct of the employer’s business.”53 When an 
employee’s bona fide religious belief or practice conflicts 
with an employment requirement, Title VII requires the 
employer to accommodate that belief or practice, within 
reasonable limits.54
How might an employee claim his or her tattoo is a 
religious symbol? In the case of a cross or a Star of David, 
the answer may be obvious. But other less conventional 
tattoos might also be religious symbols, since under Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) guide-
lines an employee’s religious beliefs need not be espoused 
by a formal religion or a traditional church. The EEOC 
guidelines on religious discrimination recognize, “[t]he 
fact that no religious group espouses such beliefs or the fact 
that the religious group to which the individual professes 
to belong may not accept such belief will not determine 
whether the belief is a religious belief of the employee.”55 
This broad view has been endorsed by the Supreme Court, 
which has held that Title VII’s protections are not limited 
to beliefs and practices that courts perceive as “acceptable, 
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others.” 56
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But even if an employee asserts a tattoo is a religious 
symbol, the employee must also demonstrate that the tat-
too reflects a sincere belief, and is not merely a decoration. 
Further, the employee must notify the employer of his or 
her religious belief or practice, and the employee must 
demonstrate that the religious belief or practice was the 
basis for an adverse employment decision.57 Once a plain-
tiff establishes a prima facie case of religious discrimination 
based on a failure to accommodate, the burden shifts to 
the employer to show that it offered the employee a rea-
sonable accommodation of the religious practice, to show 
that any accommodation would result in undue hardship 
for the employer. Once an employer offers a reasonable 
accommodation, its obligations under Title VII are satis-
fied.58 The accommodation does not have to be the best 
accommodation possible, and the employer does not have 
to demonstrate that alternative accommodations would 
be worse or impose an undue hardship.59 
With this framework in mind, we review five Title VII 
religion cases involving tattoos in the workplace. 
In the first case, Swartzentruber v. Gunite Corporation,60 
an employee named Sheldon Swartzentruber worked in a 
manufacturing plant but was also a member of the KKK. 
He had tattoo of a hooded figure with a burning cross 
prominently displayed on his forearm, which he claimed 
was a sacred symbol of his religion.
Although Swartzentruber agreed to cover his tattoo 
while at work, Gunite Corporation management re-
ceived reports from other employees that he was leaving 
his tattoo uncovered for extended periods of time. The 
employer directed two of Swartzentruber’s supervisors to 
monitor him closely. Swartzentruber believed that such 
monitoring was harassment, and so filed a complaint 
alleging that by requiring him to cover his tattoo his 
employer was discriminating against him on the basis of 
his religious beliefs.
To establish a prima facie case, Swartzentruber had to 
show that he held a sincere religious belief that conflicted 
with a business requirement. The court found that Swart-
zentruber failed to establish a prima facie case. Moreover, 
the court said that even if Swartzentruber had established 
a prima facie case, his claim would have failed, since allow-
ing him to have his tattoo in plain sight at the workplace 
would have caused an undue hardship on the employer. 
The court reasoned that: “Some would certainly view a 
burning cross as ‘a precursor to physical violence and 
abuse against African-Americans and . . . an unmistakable 
symbol of hatred and violence based on virulent notions 
of racial supremacy.’” 61Accordingly, the court dismissed 
Swartzentruber’s claim and upheld the employer’s require-
ment that he cover the offensive tattoo.
In the second case, EEOC v. Red Robin Gourmet Burg-
ers Inc.,62 the court reached a different result. Here, a 
restaurant employee named Edward Rangel was fired for 
refusing to cover two religious tattoos on his wrist. Rangel 
had agreed to the restaurant’s appearance policy when 
he was hired, and that policy prohibited visible tattoos 
and piercings. However, Rangel practiced Kemeticism, a 
religion with roots in ancient Egypt, and he had tattoos 
on each wrist signifying his servitude to the Egyptian sun 
god Ra. Rangel argued that it would be a sin for him to 
hide the tattoos because of their religious significance. 
Unlike Swartzentruber, Rangel established a prima 
facie case of a sincere religious belief that conflicted with 
a business requirement. Thus, the restaurant had to show 
that it would suffer an undue hardship in accommodating 
the tattooed employee, and the employer tried to do so, 
arguing that tattooed employees were antithetical to the 
family-oriented nature of their business. However, the 
court found that the restaurant did not suffer any undue 
hardship, as Rangel had been working there for a full six 
months without incident before he was asked to cover his 
tattoos. No customers had complained, and the employer’s 
argument was unavailing.  
In the third case, Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp,63 
an employee named Kimberly Cloutier was a member of 
the Church of Body Modification, an organized church 
that emphasizes, as part of its religious doctrine, spiritual 
growth through body modification. Over a two year period 
while working for Costco, Cloutier increasingly engaged 
in the practices of tattooing and body piercing. When she 
was moved to a sales position in the food department, she 
was told that although her tattoos were not a problem, 
her facial piercings violated Costco’s dress code policy. 
Cloutier refused to remove her piercings, and was fired. 
Cloutier sued under Title VII, but lost. Although the 
federal district court found that the Church of Body Modi-
fication was a bona fide religion, and that the Cloutier was 
sincere in her belief that practicing ancient body modifica-
tion rites was essential to spirituality, there was a significant 
catch. Specifically, the court found that Cloutier’s religion 
did not require a display of facial piercings at all times, 
and that covering her facial piercings during work hours 
would not infringe on her religious beliefs any more than 
covering her tattoos by wearing a long-sleeved shirt would. 
The court ruled that the employer had fully satisfied its 
legal obligations to provide a religious accommodation. 
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the district court, but further held that Costco had no duty 
to accommodate its sales employee’s religious beliefs by 
exempting her from the organization’s dress code, because 
to do so would impose an undue hardship. 
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In the fourth case, Finkelshteyn v. Staten Island Univer-
sity Hospital,64 an employee named Lenny Finkelshteyn, 
who worked as a nurse, claimed that because he was 
Jewish he was subjected to a hostile work environment, 
disparate treatment, constructive discharge, and retalia-
tion. After he had been employed for a while by the hos-
pital, he got a tattoo, which he showed to his coworkers. 
Specifically, Finkelshteyn “had the emblem and Hebrew 
initials of the ‘Israeli Defense League’ (described by 
Finkelshteyn as a counter-terrorism, special forces unit 
of the Israeli military) tattooed on his upper-arm.”65 He 
testified that his supervisor looked at his tattoo and said 
he was crazy, which he claimed was evidence of a hostile 
working environment.
The court disagreed, holding that comments that may 
have been made by his supervisor or co-workers about 
his tattoo did not support his claim. The court noted 
that “Finkelshteyn fails to allege the use of incendiary 
language or overtly discriminatory epithets. Moreover, 
even he concedes that his co-worker’s reactions  [26] just 
as likely reflected their shock at his new and admittedly 
prominent tattoo than mockery of his faith.”66 Thus, there 
was no reasonable inference of discrimination arising from 
the supervisor’s comment about his tattoo; there was, 
however, sufficient other evidence of a hostile working 
environment to cause the court to deny the employer’s 
motion to dismiss. 
In the fifth and final case, Baltazar v. Petland Discs. Inc.,67 
an employee named Mynor Baltazar worked as a clerk in 
a pet store. He was also a priest of the Garifuna religion, 
and he claimed he was required by his employer to cover 
his tattoo while at work, in violation of his religious beliefs 
under Title VII. The court did not render a decision on 
the merits of his religious discrimination claim in this case, 
but denied the employee’s motion to amend his complaint.
Thus, a review of the reported cases involving religious 
discrimination claims by tattooed employees shows that 
an employee may be able to successfully demonstrate that 
a tattoo is a religious symbol. The harder question for the 
courts to resolve is whether display of the tattoo may be 
reasonably accommodated by the employer, particularly 
given the wide variety of settings in which employees work. 
Title Vii Race or  
sex Discrimination Cases
Title VII includes a prohibition of discrimination in 
employment on the basis of race or sex, and there are a 
few cases in which the existence of a tattoo was offered as 
evidence of race or sex animus. 
The first case in which a tattoo played a role in trying 
to discern intent to discriminate on the basis of race is 
Greathouse v. Alvin Independent School District.68 This 
case was brought under the Texas Commission on Hu-
man Rights Act (TCHRA), which mirrors Title VII.69 
The case involved an African-American supervisor named 
Hubbard, who had a tattoo on his hand that signified, 
according to his subordinate employee Doug Greathouse, 
“African-American intolerance for Caucasians.”70 When 
the supervisor dismissed Greathouse, a white employee, 
Greathouse claimed race discrimination. 
The Texas Court of Appeals considered whether Hub-
bard’s tattoo, along with alleged anti-white statements by 
Hubbard, showed racial animus on his part. The court 
held that Greathouse raised a genuine issue of material 
fact concerning whether he was treated differently from 
non-Caucasian employees, and whether Hubbard’s stated 
non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Greathouse 
were a pretext for racial discrimination.71 Thus, the Texas 
Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court had mistak-
enly granted summary judgment for the employer and 
remanded the case for trial.
A second case in which a tattoo played a part in deter-
mining whether race discrimination played a part in an 
employer’s decision first to deny a promotion and later to 
fire an employee is King v. STA Mobile, Inc.72  There, an 
African-American employee named Samuel King claimed 
he was denied a promotion to a senior position on more 
than one occasion, and later fired by his white supervisor, 
all on account of his race. King also claimed there was a 
racially-hostile working environment at the company, cit-
ing a number of instances in which he was called offensive 
names and subjected to images of the Confederate flag 
in the workplace--including having to work with a white 
supervisor who displayed a Confederate flag tattoo.73 The 
court denied the employer’s motion for summary judg-
ment, in part, and remanded the case for trial.
A third case involves a claim of both race and sex 
discrimination, Goetz v. City of Forest Park.74 There, a 
firefighter named Linda Goetz had obtained a dragonfly 
tattoo on the left side of her neck, a dandelion tattoo 
on the right side of her neck, and a cross tattoo on the 
inner side of her left bicep. Her fire chief instructed her 
to cover all of these tattoos while on duty, in accordance 
with an appearance code the city had adopted. However, 
Goetz observed that another employee who was African-
American had a tattoo which she was allowed to display 
while on duty, and that yet another co-worker who was 
male did not have to cover his tattoos while at work. 
When Goetz refused to cover her tattoos, she received a 
letter of reprimand; she then brought a claim of race and 
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sex discrimination under Title VII, claiming she was the 
victim of disparate treatment.
The court found no direct evidence of discrimination. 
As to the claim that Goetz’ African-American co-worker 
did not have to cover up her tattoo, the court rejected the 
claim that her tattoo was less conspicuous than Goetz’s 
because she was African-American while Goetz was white. 
The court found that the fire chief believed the African-
American employee’s tattoo was less conspicuous because 
it was smaller or in an area that was less noticeable under 
her uniform, not because it was less likely to show up on 
her darker skin. In addition, the court found no direct 
evidence of sex discrimination based on her assertion that 
a male employee had a tattoo and was not reprimanded. 
Importantly, Goetz admitted that no one ever told her 
she had to cover her tattoo because she was female. In 
short, there was no finding that she was treated differently 
because she was a white female, and the court granted 
summary judgment to the employer.  
Although there are few cases on point, a review of Title 
VII race or sex discrimination decisions involving tattooed 
employees shows that tattoos may be cited as indicative of 
a frame of mind or bias; however, courts will still require 
a demonstration of underlying motive consistent with the 
established shifting-burden framework of Title VII cases.75
Conclusion
To return to our original question, what liability may 
an employer have for refusing to hire an applicant with 
a tattoo, or for discharging a tattooed employee? As is 
shown from a review of the reported cases, employers 
have wide latitude in taking such actions. This does 
not mean employers should have a cavalier attitude, of 
course; they need to think carefully about whether their 
decision to reject a tattooed applicant is grounded in a 
legitimate business purpose, or whether their decision 
to discipline a tattooed employee may be challenged as 
disparate treatment. 
It is difficult to predict how the case law will develop 
in this area, but it is reasonable to expect that as more 
Americans, particularly younger workers now entering 
the workforce, get tattoos, there may be more conflict 
between the desire of employees to express themselves 
and the need of employers to preserve a professional 
environment. If that happens, there may be a substantial 
increase in the number of challenges brought by employ-
ees who are directed to cover their tattoos. Alternatively, 
there may be a shift in the attitude of employers over 
time, in which they become more tolerant of tattooed 
applicants and employees and do not direct them to 
cover their tattoos. Thus far, the courts have been largely 
sympathetic to the arguments of employers that their 
interest in a workplace free from undue disruption--or 
that simply turns off customers-- is a rational basis for 
limiting the display of tattoos on the job. Whether 
courts will become more sympathetic towards tattooed 
applicants and employees is also hard to predict. Either 
way, we can expect more cases to be heard in the courts 
in the decade to come.
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